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Klein,: Corbett in Orbit

CORBETT IN ORBIT
A Maritime Model for Strategic Space Theory
Lieutenant Commander John J. Klein, U.S. Navy

Despite its growing importance, no comprehensive theory of space
power has been formulated.
COLIN GRAY

S

ince the 1950s, there have been discussions concerning the need to develop a
1
space power theory. In their attempts to formulate such a theory, strategists
have noted the similarities of space operations to those of air and naval operations. Consequently, many have attempted to derive a clearly articulated, allencompassing space theory through analogy and comparison to either airpower
or sea-control models. These efforts, however, as observers like the contemporary historian and strategist Colin Gray have noted, have not produced a theory
2
addressing space operations and associated national interests. Without such a
strategic framework for space, some analysts fear that national resources and
military force will be applied poorly or even counterproductively.
This article, accordingly, addresses the need to codify a space theory. Do space operations and national
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adequately modeled. In fact, maritime theory already exists, in the work of Sir
Julian Corbett, on the basis of which maritime strategy can be defined and then
the principles of space theory developed. The resulting maritime-based space theory largely meets the test of current observations and ideas while highlighting significant areas that contemporary space literature has omitted.
The United States has developed space systems and doctrine quite well without the benefit of space theory; why bother deriving one? The reason is the adage, “You don’t know what you don’t know.” A theory attempts to make sense of
what would otherwise be inscrutable, to set forth “rules of the game” by which
3
actions become intelligible. According to the Prussian military strategist and
theorist Carl von Clausewitz, theory “gives the mind insight into the great mass
of phenomena and of their relationships, then leaves it free to rise into the
4
higher realms of action.”
To achieve in connection with space the kind of insight of which Clausewitz
wrote, this article will compare past strategic theories and use the most suitable
model as a framework for a strategic space theory. Using historical theories as a
guide increases the likelihood of developing a meaningful space theory beyond
5
that which arbitrary choice, pure chance, or blind intuition would allow.
CURRENT OPERATIONS AND NATIONAL INTERESTS
The United States has become increasingly reliant upon space. Space-based
technology enters homes, businesses, schools, hospitals, and government offices
through applications related to transportation, health, the environment, telecommunications, education, commerce, agriculture, energy, and military operations.6
Although the range is indeed broad, the nation’s space activities can be di7
vided into four major sectors—civil, commercial, intelligence, and military.
Civil space activities are those aimed at exploring space and advancing human
understanding; the missions performed by the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration fall into this category. Commercial activities are performed by
private companies and industry for profit. The intelligence sector involves surveillance and reconnaissance missions conducted by such government agencies
as the National Reconnaissance Office. Lastly, military activities are those promoting national security through offensive or defensive operations in and
through space. Space-based systems may, consistently with international law,
perform essential functions facilitating military activities on land, in the air,
8
and on and under the sea. Because of the diverse and pervasive nature of the
space activities of the United States, its space operations have implications
spanning all elements of national power—diplomatic, military, economic, tech9
nological, or information.
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NAVAL AND AIR MODELS
As Colin Gray has observed, space operations have more in common with the
10
sea and the air than is widely appreciated. For just as space operations utilize
ground facilities, up-and-down links to vehicles in orbit, and the satellites themselves, so naval and air operations have bases at home and facilities abroad, as
well as ships and planes. Like international airspace and waters, space is open to
11
all nations; it is free from claims of sovereignty and national appropriation. Because of these similarities, Gray declares, “the history of sea power and air power
12
offers true precedents for developing a space strategy.” For that reason, many elements of current space power theory have been derived from various tenets of
airpower and sea control theories.13
The Air Model
There is no single airpower theory of the comprehensiveness and universality of
14
Clausewitz’s work on land power. Air Marshal Giulio Douhet of Italy is gener15
ally credited with developing the first of the theories of airpower that now exist.
In his The Command of the Air he contended that aircraft are the solution to stra16
tegic and tactical stalemates, and that all future wars could be won from the air.
He found the aircraft’s superiority in its offensive characteristics—freedom of
17
maneuver and speed—which accrue from operating in the air. Furthermore,
Douhet’s formula for victory includes gaining command of the air and then
18
neutralizing the enemy’s vital centers.
In a supporting view after the First World War, Brigadier General William
“Billy” Mitchell declared, “As air covers the whole world, aircraft are able to go
19
anywhere on the planet . . . [and] have set aside all ideas of frontiers.” Mitchell
held that some air operations, such as strategic bombing, can achieve independent results, thereby winning wars through destruction of the enemy’s
20
war-making capability and will to fight. The nation that wins the air war,
21
Mitchell was convinced, is practically certain to win the entire conflict.
Early thinkers on space forces considered them simply “high-flying air
22
forces.” For example, U.S. Air Force space doctrine was first established merely
23
by replacing the word “air” with the coinage “aerospace” in the literature. According to aerospace integrationists, space power is no different from airpower,
24
because it delivers similar products to users. Consequently, in that view, no
separate space power theory or definition is warranted, since aerospace power
25
embraces space operations.
Nevertheless, many critics have argued against combining air and space theories, pointing out that the respective propulsive, aerodynamic, and orbitalmechanics conditions and requirements make air and space quite distinct
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26

media. These differences are manifested in the differing ability of aircraft and
space systems to maneuver and loiter.
If air and space are different media, however, they are made interrelated and
interdependent by shared activities and mutual boundaries. For example, no
space vehicle can ascend into orbit without traversing the air realm. The history
and development of aerospace power theory is, consequently, useful for the derivation of strategic space theory, since it incorporates the interaction of media and
forces. The point is that space theory should be “holistic,” addressing the indirect
effects of space operations on national strategy and nonspace activities.
The Naval Model
Some strategists, pointing to the similarities between sea and space operations,
suggest that the best possible space theory would be achieved by simply substi27
tuting “space” for “sea” in naval strategy. Naval theory, however, deals with
28
ships, shipbuilding, war at sea, and military forces associated with navies.
Moreover, naval theory is primarily concerned with the means and methods of
employing force at sea to achieve national goals while increasing national power
and prestige. This emphasis on naval operations and fleet actions results in a
“sea” and “navy”-centric perspective. Consequently, the applicability of the naval model to space is limited, since it does not adequately encompass the interaction and interdependence of other environments or military forces.
Both air and naval models are relevant to space operations and activities, but
neither possesses the breadth needed for a strategic space theory. The air
model, in its aerospace variant, takes into account the interrelationships of
other forces and environments, but it has a primarily military focus. The naval
model includes national interests, such as prestige and power, but is focused on
naval engagements alone and tends to exclude other operations or forces. Yet
there is a theoretical model that incorporates other mediums and forces, as
aerospace power does, while including broad national interests, as the naval
model does.
A MARITIME MODEL
The term “maritime,” in contrast to “naval,” connotes the whole range of activities and interests regarding the seas and oceans of the world, and their interrelationships: science, technology, cartography, industry, economics, trade, politics,
international affairs, imperial expansion, communications, migration, inter29
national law, social affairs, and leadership. Additionally, maritime theory
includes the interaction between sea and land. Since many national and local
economies have historically depended upon ports for trade and general
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economic well-being, the need to protect maritime trade with fleets arose. Naval
theory, therefore, is but a subset of maritime theory.
The maritime model, then, appears to match more closely the various issues
of space operations than does either air or naval theory. But a number of major
theoreticians have worked in this field. If maritime theory is to be the framework
of a strategic framework for space, whose version should be used?
The work of Alfred Thayer Mahan, particularly The Influence of Sea Power
30
upon History 1660–1783, has been frequently employed in this connection.
Mahan is credited with linking maritime and naval activities to national and international issues, as well as with laying out principles for the formulation of naval strategy.31 His writings address national policy, sea power, sea control,
offensive versus defensive operations, speed and mobility, communications,
32
trade, concentration of force, and strategic position. Indeed, Mahan is extensively quoted, especially in the United States, to promote a variety of ideas. In the
search for axioms on strategy, his ideas have been “used, misused, superseded,
33
broadened, and modified.” Mahan’s strategic theory, properly understood, insists that the “proper sphere” of the fleet is offensive operations and gives little
attention to matters, such as interaction with land armies, outside the direct action of navies and fleets. Consequently, Mahan’s theory does not incorporate adequately for present purposes the interaction and interdependence of other
mediums and forces. If not Mahan, then who?
Perhaps the answer is Sir Julian Corbett, whose work many (though not all)
historians regard highly as a coherent and convincing exposition of maritime
34
principles. Sir Julian Stafford Corbett (1854–1922), acclaimed as Great Britain’s greatest maritime strategist, is particularly renowned for his 1911 work
35
Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, a “fusion of history and strategy.” Corbett
took up many of the same issues as Mahan, but his writings are widely considered more accurate, more complete, and “more logically developed” than
36
Mahan’s. Additionally, many historians regard Corbett as the deepest and most
37
flexible thinker among either maritime or naval theorists. Therefore, it is
Corbett’s ideas and principles, from Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, that
38
we will use as a framework for deriving a strategic space theory.
Corbett wrote of the implications for national power of maritime operations in
both peace and war. Like Carl von Clausewitz—whom he cites extensively—
Corbett recognized that both land and sea operations are influenced by national
politics and interests. The object of naval warfare being in his view to control
maritime communications, including commercial and economic aspects,
Corbett held that naval action can influence the balance of wealth and power
39
among nations.
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Nonetheless, Corbett acknowledged that sea and land operations are interdependent, that naval strategy and operations constitute only a subset of a nation’s
wartime operations. He repeatedly stated the necessity for the closest cooperation of ground and sea forces. In fact, in a departure from the conventional
thought of his day, Corbett considered it of paramount importance that naval
strategy work within the overall national strategy, since it is almost impossible
for war to be decided by naval action alone (Some Principles, page 15). Therefore,
the purpose of maritime strategy is to determine the “mutual relations of your
40
army and navy in a plan of war” (page 16).
Another theme of Corbett’s work is “command of the sea,” which he considers different from the occupation of territory by an army, for the high seas cannot be subjected to political dominion or ownership. The inherent value of the
sea, in his view, is as a means of communication. Consequently, Corbett defines
command of the sea as the “control of maritime communications, whether for
commercial or military purposes” (94). He explicitly states, however, that to
command the sea is a relative advantage, not an absolute; it does not mean that
the enemy cannot act, only that it cannot seriously interfere with one’s actions.
The normal state of affairs, Corbett observes, is not a commanded sea but an uncommanded one—that is, command of the sea is normally in dispute (91).
Maritime communications pertain to those routes by which the flow of “national life is maintained ashore”; therefore, they have a broader meaning than
land lines of communication and are not analogous to those traditionally used
41
by armies (93, 100). While maritime communications include supply and
trade, they also include lines of communication that are of a strategic nature and
are thus critical for a nation’s survival. The objective of controlling maritime
communications is protection of one’s own commerce and interference with the
enemy’s economic interests, ultimately the defeat of the adversary’s “power of
resistance” (102). Corbett argues that the primary object of the fleet, therefore, is
to secure sea lines of communication, putting the enemy’s fleet out of action if it
is in a position to render them unsafe (102).
For Corbett, offensive operations are called for when political objectives necessitate acquiring something from the enemy; as a more “effective” (his term)
form of war than the defensive, offensive operations should be the preference of
the stronger power (31). Notwithstanding the advantage of the offensive, however, even a superior naval force seeking a decisive victory will likely find the enemy in a position where he cannot easily be affected; throughout naval history
fleets have been able to thwart attempts to force decisive battle by retiring to the
safety of coasts and ports (158). Still, and despite this limitation, Corbett expressed concern that some naval professionals made a fetish of the offensive.
Corbett argued that defensive operations should not be shunned or avoided;
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they are, he held, specifically called for when political objectives necessitate preventing the enemy from gaining something (32). Moreover, defensive operations are the “stronger” form of war and, as a rule, should be resorted to by the
42
weaker navy until it is strong enough to assume the offensive (310–11).
Like Clausewitz, Corbett classified wars according to whether the object is
limited or unlimited. Because of the nonescalatory nature of truly limited warfare, a nation initiating a limited war needs the “power of isolation” to defend itself against an unlimited counterstroke. Such “isolation” could be achieved by
commanding the sea to such a degree as to make it effectively an “insuperable
physical obstacle.” In such a case, “He that commands the sea is at great liberty
43
and may take as much or as little of the war as he will.”
Corbett envisioned several actions that may be taken by lesser naval powers to
dispute command of the sea. A lesser naval force would be unlikely to win a decisive major fleet engagement, yet it could achieve significant results. Through minor naval actions—such as attacks on sea lanes and coastal raids (261–62)—it
could contest a superior power’s command of the sea and thereby accomplish at
least limited political objectives. In such ways a lesser power could disturb enemy plans, regardless of its fleet’s size, while strengthening its own national
power and prestige (61).
A small navy could also effectively dispute command of the sea through the
44
“fleet in being” concept (166). A decisive defeat at the hands of a more capable
navy would make one’s fleet unavailable should the situation later develop in
one’s favor (211). Consequently, keeping its fleet actively “in being”—not
merely in existence but in active and vigorous life—constitutes a defensive strat45
egy for a relatively small maritime power (214).
Corbett theorized that victory at sea is dependent upon the relative strength
of one’s force and the exploitation of one’s “positions”—naval bases, commer46
cial, and nearby focal areas where trade routes converge (106). If correctly exploited, strategic positions allow a naval force to restrict the size of any enemy
force, thus creating favorable conditions for battle (72). Corbett specifically considered it more effective to control ports and maritime choke points, thereby
threatening the enemy’s commerce and potentially luring his fleet into battle on
one’s own terms, than to seek out the enemy’s fleet for a decisive action (185).
Relatedly, Corbett envisioned blockades, of two types, “close” and “open.”
The former closes the enemy’s commercial ports. “By closing [the enemy’s]
commercial ports we exercise the highest power of injuring him which the command of the sea can give us”—the enemy must either submit to the close blockade or fight to release himself (185). In contrast, in an open blockade a fleet
occupies distant and common lines of communication—a means for a stronger
navy to force the enemy out of its harbors. “It is better to sit upon his homeward
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bound trade routes, thus costing him his trade, or making his fleet come for a decisive battle,” than repeatedly attempt to seek out an enemy who habitually retires to the safety of his ports (156–57).
The obverse of blocking maritime communications—in fact, the object of
naval warfare, in Corbett’s view—is protecting them. This was to be achieved by
the “cruiser,” a vessel of endurance and power sufficient for long, independent
deployments to deter and thwart enemy commerce raiding and protect sea lines
of communication. Corbett considered the importance even of the battleship
secondary to that of the cruiser (114). Because of the wide expanses of sea and
the numerous maritime routes and coastlines involved, cruisers had to be built
in significant numbers.
Finally, if cruisers were to be dispersed to distant operating areas, naval forces
had also to be able to concentrate rapidly and decisively when needed (132).
Such a strategic combination of concentration and dispersal in warfare, Corbett
argues, allows a fleet to engage the enemy’s central mass when needed but in the
meantime to preserve the flexibility necessary to control maritime communications and to meet minor attacks in several areas at once (133).
DERIVING A STRATEGIC SPACE THEORY
With this understanding of maritime theory as described by Sir Julian Corbett,
it is possible to extrapolate and define a theory for space operations. Maritime
operations are not the same as space operations; environmental, technological,
and physical factors are definitively different. Nevertheless, many of their strategic aspects are similar, and therefore they may be presumed to share certain theoretical principles. We may attempt, therefore, to derive objectively a space
theory in strict keeping with Corbett’s original context and strategic intent, verifying the applicability of its principles against contemporary literature.
National Power Implications. Space operations and activities utilizing
space-based assets have broad implications for national power in peace and war,
implications that include diplomatic, military, economic, technological, and information elements. Furthermore, military operations in space are extensively
interrelated with national and political interests, and any action in space, even
minor ones, can impact the balance of wealth and power among nations.
Interdependence with Other Operations. Operations in space are interdependent with those on land, at sea, and in the air. Space warfare is just a subset of
wartime strategy and operations; accordingly, space forces must operate in concert with other military forces. Moreover, space strategy should work within the
overall national strategy, since it is next to impossible for space operations alone
to decide a war’s outcome.
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Command of Space. Command of space is the control of space communications
47
for civil, commercial, intelligence, and military purposes. The inherent value
of space is as a means of communications; therefore, space warfare must work
directly or indirectly toward either securing command of space or preventing
the enemy from securing it. Command of space does not mean that one’s adversary cannot act, only that he cannot seriously interfere in one’s actions. Additionally, the command of space will normally be in dispute.
Space Communications. Space communications are those lines of communications by which the flow of national life is sustained in and through space. These
include strategic lines of communication, critical to a nation’s survival, that
serve the movement of trade, materiel, supplies, and information. By attack
upon space communications, a nation can adversely affect another’s civil, commercial, intelligence, and military activities, thereby reducing that nation’s will
to resist. The primary purpose of space warfare is to secure space communications; enemy forces that are in a position to render them unsafe must be put out
of action.
Strategy of the Offense. Offensive operations in space are called for when political objectives necessitate acquiring something from the adversary. Generally
speaking, offensive operations in space are reserved to the stronger space power.
However, an offensive force looking for a decisive victory will likely not find it,
since the enemy will usually fall back to a position of safety. Offensive operations must be decided upon with caution; space assets can be thrown away on
48
ill-considered attacks.
Strategy of the Defense. Despite the advantage of offensive space operations, the
utility of defensive operations is substantial; offensive and defensive operations
are mutually complementary, and any campaign must have characteristics of
both. Defensive space operations are called for when political objectives necessitate preventing the enemy from achieving or gaining something. Defensive operations are inherently the stronger form of action and should be used
extensively by lesser space forces until the offensive can be assumed.
The Power of Isolation. A nation wishing to initiate limited war in or through
space requires a defensive capability adequate to protect itself against an unlimited counterattack. The “power of isolation” is made possible by commanding
space and making it an insuperable physical obstacle, enabling one nation to attack another for limited political purposes without fear of a devastating counteroffensive. To paraphrase Corbett, “He that commands space is at great liberty
and may take as much or as little of the war as he will.”
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Actions by Lesser Space Forces. Although a less capable space force is unlikely to
win a decisive space engagement, it can still contest the command of space,
thereby achieving limited political objectives. To this end the weaker force may
seize local or temporary command in areas where the stronger force is not present. Additionally, lesser space forces can disrupt commercial or economic interests or interfere in minor ways with space-based systems. Both types of action
are meant to disturb an enemy’s plans while increasing the lesser nation’s power.
Another effective method by which a lesser space force might dispute command is the “fleet in being” concept. It is important for relatively weak space
forces to avoid decisive engagements with stronger ones, but they can be kept
safe and active until the situation changes in their favor. Furthermore, while
avoiding large-scale engagements with a superior space force, a lesser one can conduct minor attacks against space communications or space-related activities, thus
preventing the stronger power from gaining general command of space.
Strategic Positions. Strategic positions include launch facilities, up-and-down
link systems, space bases or stations, and focal areas where operations and activities tend to converge. If correctly exploited, strategic positions allow a space
force to restrict the movement of the enemy forces or information, thus improving the conditions for military operations. Since it will prove difficult to force an
adversary into a decisive engagement, it is better to control strategic positions
and threaten commerce and operations, thereby forcing the enemy to action on
favorable terms. By exploiting strategic positions through occupation of the enemy’s space lanes of communication and closing points of distribution, we de49
stroy elements of the enemy’s “national life” in space.
Blockades. Closely related to strategic positions are the methods of blockades,
whether close or open. The close blockade for space operations equates to preventing the deployment of systems from launch facilities and to interfering with
communications in the vicinity of uplinks or downlinks, as well as impeding the
movement of vehicles near space-based hubs. Close blockade may be achieved
by physical systems or vehicles or interference measures. In Corbett’s model,
suppressing operations at these distribution points obliges the adversary either
to submit or fight. In contrast, a more capable space power can impose an open
blockade, occupying or interfering with the distant and common space lines of
communication, to force an adversary into action. Like the close blockade,
methods include both physical systems and interference.
Cruisers. The object of space warfare is to control space communications, and
therefore a means of establishing this control is required. Consequently “cruisers” are needed in large numbers to defend the vast volumes occupied by space
lines of communication. One possible implementation of the “cruiser” concept
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would be inexpensive micro-satellites designed to defend high-value space assets from attack or space-based interference. Space systems that perform purely
offensive operations with negligible influence on space lines of communication
are of secondary importance.
Dispersal of Forces. Space forces and systems should in general be dispersed to
cover the widest possible area yet retain the ability to concentrate decisive force
rapidly. Dispersal of forces will allow the protection of a nation’s space assets and
interests, thereby facilitating defensive operations or minor attacks wherever a
nation’s space interests are threatened. To defend against or neutralize a significant threat, however, space forces should quickly concentrate firepower or other
destructive effects. This combination of dispersal and concentration preserves
the flexibility needed to control space communications but allows an adversary’s
“central mass” to be engaged when necessary.
MEASURING UTILITY
Since the principles of the above space theory were derived from a historical
framework, it is necessary to test them against current expert observations and
space literature to measure the theory’s potential utility. Two standards will be
50
used: a recent study regarding space operations, and U.S. joint military doctrine.
Standards
The 2001 Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security
Space Management and Organization, known as the Space Commission Report,
covers a broad range of issues pertaining to U.S. space activity. The report lists
current U.S. national interests pertaining to operations in space, including: promoting the peaceful use of space; using the nation’s potential in space to support
its domestic, economic, diplomatic, and national security objectives; assured access to space and on-orbit operations; space situational awareness; surveillance
from space; global command, control, and communications in space; defense in
51
space; homeland defense; and power projection in, from, and through space.
With the exception of promoting the peaceful use of space, the listed national interests are compatible with those of the diplomatic, military, economic, technological, and information national interests in the derived space theory model.
While the Space Commission Report does not explicitly state the need for offensive capability and strategy in space, it does imply this view. The report notes,
“Weapons in space are inevitable,” and “we know from history that every medium—air, land, and sea—has seen conflict. Reality indicates that space will be
52
no different.” Given this virtual certainty of future combat operations, the report maintains, the United States must develop the means to “deter and to de53
fend” against hostile acts in and from space. Notwithstanding the use of the
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word deter, the method of achieving this is compatible with offensive strategy as
developed in the space theory.
Joint Publication 3-14, Joint Doctrine for Space Operations, primarily deals
with establishing doctrine for space operations at the operational level of warfare; however, it does address some strategic security issues that can be com54
pared with the space theory model. Like the Space Commission Report, the
joint publication states the need to protect U.S. space assets while denying the
use of space assets by adversaries. This thought is comparable with the idea of
commanding space to protect one’s use of space communications. In fact, the
joint publication’s definition of “space control” is similar to ideas in the derived
strategic space theory. The publication states:
Space control operations provide freedom of action in space for friendly forces while,
when directed, denying it to an adversary, and include the broad aspect of protection
of U.S. and allied space systems and negation of enemy adversary space systems.
Space control operations encompass all elements of the space defense mission and
include offensive and defensive operations by friendly forces to gain and maintain
space superiority and situational awareness if events impact space operations.55

Of note, the joint publication states that both offensive and defensive operations
are needed, which is consistent with the maritime-based space theory.
Divergences from the Standards
The Space Commission Report discusses topics not within the scope of maritimebased space theory. These topics include reorganization and streamlining of different U.S. space-related agencies, and the need for the United States to invest its
resources—both people and monetary investment—to ensure that it remains
56
the world’s leading space-faring nation. Since the report is not attempting to
develop space theory, the inclusion of bureaucratic organization and streamlining issues is understandable; certainly, the need to invest in space operations is
implicit in space theory.
Differences between Joint Publication 3-14 and the space theory are primarily matters of semantics or due to the operational focus of the publication. Such
differences include the use of “freedom of action,” “space superiority,” and “situational awareness,” not found in the maritime-based theory we have proposed.
The differences are, however, considered minor when comparing the strategic
context of each.
Nevertheless, three ideas from the developed space theory are neither explicitly nor implicitly mentioned in popular space literature. These ideas are the
“power of isolation” to prevent the escalation of limited wars, the use of “cruisers” to ensure command of space, and the dispersal of force as a general practice.
These differences could mean one of two things: either that these points are
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baseless or that they are pertinent but not adequately addressed by contemporary literature. Given the relevance of the majority of the principles of the maritime model, the remaining three ideas—which deal with securing space
communications—are likely relevant as well.
This is a significant result: a maritime-based strategic framework points to an
effective method of defending space assets and space lines of communications.
Through the use of space “cruisers”— to protect critical space communications
pertaining to the movement of trade, matériel, supplies, or information—a nation can protect its various interests against a space-based offensive. The physical form the space “cruiser” takes is not important, but its function is.
Additionally, since the environment of space is vast but limitations on fiscal resources necessitate balancing desired capabilities against number of systems
that can be procured, space “cruisers” should have a modest enough offensive
capability to allow production in quantity. By dispersing these space systems yet
maintaining the capability to concentrate firepower or other neutralizing effects, a threatening adversary can be decisively defeated while one’s own assets
and interests are protected.
“SO WHAT?”
A critic might well put that question. Using Corbett’s maritime model to develop a strategic space model has merely substantiated ideas already known or
written about. Indeed, much of this strategic space theory is consistent with the
Space Commission Report and joint doctrine. Nonetheless, something of real
value has been added.
First, we have seen that a historically based theoretical model promises to
provide a useful framework for thinking about strategic issues in space. Second,
a maritime model matches more closely than air or naval theory the essence of
space operations. Third, the strategic space theory derived from a maritime
model is congruent with current space-specific theory and observation. The
maritime-based model, then, should be usable for predicting new concerns and
developing new ideas—such as methods of dispersal and concentration.
Perhaps the thinking of maritime theorists other than Corbett is also pertinent for space theory. For example, the work of Charles E. Callwell, Wolfgang
57
Wegener, Raoul Castex, and James Cable merits revisiting for this purpose. In
this way, space strategy and theory will have mined hundreds of years of maritime experience for insight into future operations in and through space.
Colin Gray once asked, “Where is the theory of space power? Where is the
Mahan for the final frontier?”58 The answer is that we have always had him—the
maritime theorist Sir Julian Corbett.
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